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At the 1973 Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids, Herbert Boyer re-
vealed that he and another scientist, Stanley Cohen, had developed a sim-
ple technique for splicing genetic material from two different organisms
and reinserting the laboratory-made combination of genes into- a- bacte-
rium." The Boyer-Cohen discovery triggered experiments with the
reprogramming of natural organisms in laboratories worldwide.2 In the
decade following this genetic engineering breakthrough, commercial bio-
technology emerged as an industry promising economic well-being and
other great benefits for the United States.3 Yet the risks presented by com-
mercial biotechnology initially received little attention.4
1. S. KRIMSKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY 13, 72-73, 339 (1982).
2. The Boyer-Cohen technique transformed genetic engineering, previously accessible to only a
few leaders in the field, into a "working tool for molecular biologists." Id. at 339. See Monmaney,
Yeast At Work, Sci. 85, July-Aug. 1985, at 30, 33 (after Boyer-Cohen discovery, scientists free to
"look for genes in diverse species in the manner of mechanics prowling for spare parts in a junk-
yard"). "Genetic engineering" describes the deliberate alteration of an organism's basic genetic ma-
terial, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Joining genes from different organisms results in recombinant
DNA or "rDNA;" combining genes, such as with the Boyer-Cohen technique, is one of several basic
genetic engineering methods. See generally Hopwood, The Genetic Programming of Industrial Mi-
croorganisms, Sci. Am., Sept. 1981, at 91 (discussing various genetic engineering techniques); OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS 4-5, 33-43 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OTA 1984 ANALYSIS] (same).
3. The rapid growth since the mid-1970's of commercial biotechnology-the use of genetic engi-
neering techniques for commercial purposes-has been called a "revolution in applied biology." Abel-
son, Biotechnology: An Overview, 219 Sci. 611, 611 (1983). By 1983, private U.S. investment in the
development of commercial biotechnology applications exceeded one billion dollars per year. OTA
1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 3. Exemplifying the great hopes surrounding biotechnology's devel-
opment, the Office of Technology Assessment predicted in January, 1984, that "[bliotechnology has
the technical breadth and depth to change the industrial community of the 21st century . . . . By
virtue of its wide-reaching potential applications, biotechnology lies dose to the center of many of the
world's major problems-malnutrition, disease, energy availability and cost, and pollution." Id. at 65.
4. After the Boyer-Cohen discovery allowed widespread genetic engineering research, the risks
associated with research became the focus of significant attention by scientists and the public. Concern
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Industry researchers may soon release genetically altered microor-
ganisms into the environment to test their ability to perform such tasks as
cleaning up an oil spill or protecting crops from frost.' Though commer-
cial biotechnology offers benefits like those associated with the computer
chip and antibiotics,' release biotechnology7 threatens human health and
the natural environment with risks experts now view as comparable to the
dangers of nuclear power and toxic chemicals.' Individual release risks
about research risks resulted, for example, in the 1976 publication of "Recombinant DNA Research
Guidelines" by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). See generally
infra note 10 (discussing NIH regulation of genetic engineering). The development of commercial
applications, however, has until now progressed with little investigation into the risks associated with
commercial use. See S. KRIMSKY, supra note 1, at 285, 287 (after furor over genetic engineering
research died down, hazards received little attention; "attention was almost exclusively directed toward
commercial breakthroughs, patenting, and sources of capital for research and development").
5. See Demain & Solomon, Industrial Microbiology, Scs. AM., Sept. 1981, at 67, 74 (genetic
engineering has given one microorganism capacity to degrade all components of oil); Kriz, Growing
Biotechnology Industry Sparks Governmental Turf Battle Over Federal Regulation of Potential
Health and Environmental Risks, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 393, 394 (July 6, 1984) (discussing
planned release of microorganism designed to lower freezing temperature of plants).
On November 14, 1985, the federal government approved a test release by a California firm of
genetically engineered organisms created to protect against frost damage. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1985,
at A17, col. 1. The test was scheduled for late December, 1985, or January, 1986. Id. Whether the
test will actually take place remains uncertain; a suit has been filed to block the experiment because of
inadequate risk investigation. Id. Government approval came under an interim policy for the regula-
tion of genetically engineered pesticides. See EPA Grants Permit for Deliberate Release; Rifkin to
File Suit to Block Test, 9 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 955, 955 (Nov. 15, 1985). This interim policy is
part of the limited federal regulation taking place pending implementation of a comprehensive bio-
technology regulatory plan. See infra note 10 (academic research and genetically altered pesticides
now regulated; all commercial releases to be scrutinized under Reagan Administration Plan).
6. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856, 50,856 (1984) (genetic engineering techniques "offer exciting advances, as remarkable as the
discovery of antibiotics or the computer chip"); OTA 1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 531 (parallel
drawn between semiconductor industry and commercial development of biotechnology); S. KRIMSKY,
supra note 1, at 287 (vast range of anticipated benefits "limited only by the imagination of the
scientists").
7. "Release biotechnology" refers to one aspect of the industry. Commercial biotechnology em-
ploys genetic engineering techniques in two ways: (1) the technology may produce familiar substances
(e.g., insulin) by means of genetically engineered organisms confined within a laboratory or produc-
tion facility, or (2) the technology may produce new types of microorganisms, plants, or animals for
use in the environment. The first type of biotechnology presents risks of accidental organism release
and of injuries to workers' health. If companies follow relatively simple biological and physical con-
tainment procedures, however, this type of biotechnology poses little actual risk to health or the envi-
ronment. See The Potential Environmental Consequences of Genetic Engineering Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Potential Environmen-
tal Consequences] (statement of Thomas McGarity, Professor of Law, Univ. of Texas). Release bio-
technology, the second type, poses the larger regulatory problem and is the focus of most current
concern about commercial biotechnology. See McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology Released From the
Lab: The Environmental Regulatory Framework, 13 ENVTL. L. REs'. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10,366,
10,367 (Nov. 1983). This Note focuses on the regulatory problem associated with commercial release
biotechnology.
8. See Potential Environmental Consequences, supra note 7, at 116 (statement of Thomas Mc-
Garity) (after comparing release biotechnology development to nuclear power development and recall-
ing Three Mile Island accident, warns against late realization of release biotechnology dangers);
Mchesney & Adler, supra note 7, at 10,367 ("current crisis over hazardous byproducts of the post-
war chemical revolution counsels a cautious approach" to release biotechnology). Commercial release
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still have not been carefully evaluated; commercial biotechnology develop-
ment continues to outpace risk investigation.'
The Office of Science and Technology Policy, piecing together existing
federal regulatory powers, has devised an intricate but inadequate plan
for screening genetically engineered organisms before their commercial re-
lease into the environment.10 According to the plan, soon to be imple-
mented, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will employ the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 1 to regulate all commercial re-
lease biotechnology not covered by narrower statutes.1 2 This Note ana-
lyzes the regulatory problem presented by release biotechnology and pro-
poses amendments to TSCA that will enable EPA to function effectively
in its central new regulatory role. The Note argues that EPA should now
have the obligation under TSCA to engage in intensive, case-by-case scru-
tiny of release proposals. During these in-depth evaluations, EPA should
biotechnology, like the nuclear power and chemical industries, creates risks involving a low probability
of a high consequence disaster occurring. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
10. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Administration Plan]. This plan represents the govern-
ment's first step toward prerelease screening of all commercial biotechnologies. Since October 17,
1984, federal regulations, using the regulatory power of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982), have required prior Environmental Protection
Agency approval of field tests using genetically engineered pesticides. See Microbial Pesticides; In-
terim Policy on Small Scale Field Testing, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,659 (1984). The NIH Guidelines, while
focusing on laboratory research hazards, require prior NIH approval of academic releases to be con-
ducted by researchers receiving government funding. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombi-
nant DNA Molecules, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,266, 46,267-68 (1984). Under the government's 1984 compre-
hensive regulatory plan, NIH will continue to screen academic release proposals. See Reagan
Administration Plan, supra, at 50,905. No release experiment, academic or commercial, has yet taken
place. See EPA Advisors Cite Lack of Science, Containment Controls in rDNA Regulation, 8 CHm.
REG. REP. (BNA) 1444, 1444 (Mar. 15, 1985); see also N.Y. Times, supra note 5 (experiment
approved in Nov., 1985, will be first deliberate release if it occurs).
For information about the NIH system, which since 1980 has been available for the screening of
commercial release proposals on a voluntary basis, see McChesney & Adler, supra note 7; McGarity
& Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 V.ND. L. REv. 461 (1983);
Karny, Regulation of Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins But Time For Action
on Commercial Production, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 815 (1981). For a discussion of the litigation sur-
rounding NIH's approval of an academic release proposal, see Pendorf, Regulating the Environmen-
tal Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 891 (1985).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003
(1976)).
12. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,881. Unless congressional action or a
lawsuit blocks implementation of the proposed regulatory framework, EPA will begin oversight using
TSCA in early 1986. The target date for publication in the Federal Register of the final, binding
regulatory statement is January 31, 1986. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnol-
ogy; Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174,
47,174 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Plan Update]. Although this Note discusses decisionmaking under
TSCA, the general contours of the quasi-adversarial decisionmaking process advocated here are more
generally applicable to all government attempts to screen release biotechnology organisms, including
EPA's screening of pesticides under FIFRA. For the details of the executive branch plan concerning
genetically engineered pesticides, see Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,880-86.
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use a quasi-adversarial decisionmaking process, a process that accommo-
dates the extreme scientific uncertainty surrounding the regulatory deci-
sions.1" As knowledge about release biotechnology increases, however,
such careful scrutiny may become unnecessary; thus, TSCA amendments
should provide for future agency action to allow expedited review of cer-
tain genetically engineered products. Modifications in EPA's statutory
mandate will enable the agency to cope with its complex regulatory task
and will prevent the taking of risks that a well-informed political process
finds unacceptable.
I. THE RISKS OF COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Characteristics of the Biotechnology Industry
Approximately 200 companies are now engaged in biotechnology re-
search and development.1 4 The businesses pursuing biotechnology applica-
tions most vigorously are involved in the pharmaceuticals industry, animal
and plant agriculture, food additives, commodity and specialty chemicals,
the energy industry, environmental protection, and electronics. 5 Economic
analysts predict that genetic engineering will eventually have an impact on
70 percent of American industry."
Crucial to continuing biotechnology innovation and development are the
150 small firms, many of them new, that are attempting to capitalize on
the power of genetic engineering.17 The small companies have invested
heavily in research and feel pressure to recover their investments.1 , Sev-
eral of these businesses, quickly established following the discovery of sim-
ple genetic engineering techniques, have gone bankrupt; others undoubt-
13. For a discussion of what "quasi-adversarial decisionmaking" entails, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 89-102.
14. See OTA 1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 66.
15. See id. at 66-71. Release biotechnology products currently being developed include microor-
ganisms that will degrade environmental pollutants or extract metals from ore, McChesney & Adler,
supra note 7, at 10,366, as well as organisms that will enhance the supply of nitrogen to plants,
Demain & Solomon, supra note 5, at 74, or will enable plants to better fight root-eating bugs, Large,
Attempts to Regulate Gene Splicing Proceed in Surprising Harmony Between U.S., Industry, Wall
St. J., Jan. 9, 1985, at 50, col. 1.
16. Kriz, supra note 5, at 393.
17. See Abelson, New Biotechnology Companies, 219 Sc. 609, 609 (1983) (small firms are "[k]ey
ingredients in the dynamism of applied biology"). Small companies are crucial because they are the
primary source of genetic engineering innovations. See Kriz, supra note 5, at 399 (according to Office
of Management and Budget report, "[i]nnovation, particularly at small firms, is not merely important
in this industry-it is the industry") (emphasis in original).
18. For example, Genentech, Inc., one of the first U.S. biotechnology firms, spent $35 million in
research and development and $20 million for facilities during its first six years of existence without
selling a single ounce of product. Productivity in the American Economy: Hearings Before the Task
Force on Economic Policy and Productivity of the House Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
85 (1982) (statement of Robert Swanson, President, Genentech, Inc.).
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edly will also fail. 9 Such an uncertain, competitive situation may result in
the cutting of risk assessment corners, unless the government ensures that
adequate risk evaluations occur before the commercial release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms.20
While new, small biotechnology firms are assuming most of the eco-
nomic risk during the technology's commercial development, well-
established American companies are also making considerable investments
in the development effort. The older companies, through equity invest-
ments, license agreements, and research contracts, are providing many
new genetic engineering firms with the money to remain solvent until
sales commence.2" This combination of established and new firms working
together to commercialize genetic engineering has made the United States
the world leader in biotechnology.22 Fear of losing this preeminent posi-
tion must not blind the industry and the regulators to release biotechnol-
ogy's risks as commercial development continues. 3
19. Abelson, supra note 17, at 609. See also OTA 1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 97 (within
next several years, biotechnology industry will witness "intensified competition that forces some firms
out and creates new opportunities for more entrants"); McGarity & Bayer, supra note 10, at 465
n.19 (two biotechnology firms shut down and filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in 1982).
20. Don R. Clay, then EPA's Acting Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances,
has told Congress:
In the long run ... the intensely competitive nature of the biotechnology industry will
presumably create strong incentives for companies to reduce their costs, including those associ-
ated with developing strong safety programs.. .. [W]e cannot reasonably expect that econom-
ically vulnerable companies will voluntarily place safety as a high priority when their eco-
nomic success may be at stake.
Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations
and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Impli-
cations Hearing]. See Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1403, 1411 (1983) (industry's claim that it has too much to lose to take chances in exploiting
biotechnology "may have some validity for the giant pharmaceutical companies, but less for the newer
firms created to capitalize on the new technology").
21. See OTA 1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 11. The established companies also are entering
into joint ventures with new biotechnology firms and, to a lesser extent, are investing in their own
research and development. See id.
22. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,856; see also OTA 1984 ANALYSIS,
supra note 2, at 11 (discussing importance of established and new firms in commercializing
biotechnology).
23. The desire to create a stable situation for U.S. biotechnology development, rather than a de-
sire for actual regulation of risks, may explain current moves to erect a regulatory structure. The plan
may arise from the belief that U.S. companies can best compete with foreign producers if a lax regula-
tory scheme allays public fears, but burdens the companies with few restrictions. Presidential science
advisor George Keyworth has said that the prospect of losing out to foreign competitors made the
industry and the government sit down to agree upon a regulatory plan. Large, supra note 15. The
plan has received support from industry representatives and criticism from environmentalists. Regula-
tory Plan Draws Cautious Support From Industry; Environmentalists Concerned, 8 CHza. REG.
REP. (BNA) 1228, 1228 (Jan. 11, 1985). Representative James J. Florio (D-NJ) has called the
regulatory scheme "window dressing," a "scenario for pretended government regulation." Florio to
Offer Legislation; Conference Marked By Disagreement on Regulatory Scheme, 8 CHEm. REG. REP.(BNA) 1259, 1260 (Jan. 18, 1985). While acknowledging safety concerns, the plan itself emphasizes
that "[tihe tremendous potential of biotechnology to contribute to the nation's economy. . . makes it
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B. The Nature of Release Risks
Release biotechnology organisms must survive in the environment to
perform their work. The genetically altered organisms may be inherently
toxic or infective to natural organisms, including humans, with which they
come into contact upon release.24 Because these genetically engineered
products can feed, reproduce, mutate, and evolve, they may also produce
significant secondary effects in the environment. 25 Experience with trans-
planting natural species to new environments establishes that releasing ge-
netically engineered organisms into the environment will create ecological
and health risks.26 Risks clearly exist, but because no deliberate release of
a genetically altered organism has occurred and scientists have made little
progress in estimating release consequences,2 7 experts can today describe
the risks only in vague and general terms. This scant knowledge concern-
imperative that progress in biotechnology be encouraged." Reagan Administration Plan, supra note
10, at 50,856. See Pendorf, supra note 10, at 921 (Reagan Administration reluctant to impose regula-
tions that may compromise U.S. lead in field).
24. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC EN-
GINEERING 16 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS REPORT]
(three categories of potential release biotechnology dangers are: "(1) ecological disruption due to lack
of natural enemies; (2) infectivity, pathogenicity, or toxicity to nontarget organisms ... ; and (3)
exchange of genetic material with other organisms . . ").
25. For example, after successfully consuming an oil spill, an oil-eating microorganism could per-
sist and feed on naturally occurring hydrocarbons. The flourishing organism could deprive a water
ecosystem of oxygen and other nutrients on which naturally occurring species depend, thus establish-
ing a niche for itself to the detriment of insect, plant, or animal life in the area. McChesney & Adler,
supra note 7, at 10,368. Similarly, a microorganism created to lower the freezing temperature of
plants could be carried by the wind from a field into the upper atmosphere and change global weather
patterns. Id.
26. House sparrows, for example, first came to the United States from England as pets. The
species is now one of North America's most damaging agricultural pests. Wines, Genetic Engineer-
ing-Who'll Regulate the Rapidly Grouing Private Sector?, 1983 NAT'L J. 2096, 2098. The cata-
strophic impact of smallpox virus on the defenseless bloodstreams of 18th-century American Indians
also suggests that release biotechnology will present significant risks. See Large, supra note 15.
27. The lack of progress in accurately assessing biotechnology risks stems from the difficulty of
the task and from excitement about biotechnology's benefits, which directs attention away from risks.
See Potential Environmental Consequences, supra note 7, at 20-23 (statement of Dr. Martin Alex-
ander, Dept. of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.) (discussing need for clear distinction between concrete
knowledge about benefits, put before society by proponents of release biotechnology, and troublesome
lack of information about release risks); id. at 148-49 (statement of Jack Doyle, Dir., Agricultural
Resources Project, Environmental Policy Inst.) (great pressure for swift federal approval of products,
for continued U.S. supremacy in world market, but little debate about technology's possible harmful
consequences).
The development of risk assessment procedures is a difficult task because of the complexity of
predicting how a new organism will interact with all aspects of a natural environment. The task,
however, is not an impossible one. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 24, at
10 ("testimony indicated that it would be possible to devise procedures to produce generalized esti-
mates of the probability of environmental damage by, and survival and growth of, a genetically engi-
neered organism"); Assessment of rDNA Microbe Survivability May Be Possible With Microcosm
Ecosystem Test, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 978, 978 (Nov. 23, 1984) (microcosm test being devel-
oped to assess impacts on aquatic settings may provide first reliable method of determining genetically
engineered organism's impact before release).
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ing risks is a central feature of the regulatory problem; it stands in stark
contrast to the quite visible benefits possible from release biotechnology
products. 8
Most experts agree that the probability of harm resulting from the re-
lease of a genetically altered organism is low, but they also agree that
harm, if it occurs, could be substantial.2  The harm may be catastrophic
because the organisms may infect, poison, or displace natural species; in
addition, the genetically engineered organisms can proliferate in a suitable
niche, thus producing a large impact on the ecosystem even if only a few
organisms are released. 30 Once a problem arises, locating and killing
flourishing new organisms may be impossible.31
The nature of this risk associated with release biotechnology-low
probability of high consequence disaster-points to the need for prerelease
screening. The release products that seem likely to bring about catastro-
phe should be distinguished from safer release biotechnologies, because
prevention of their risk, where it can be accomplished at a reasonable cost,
is preferable to dealing with a high consequence disaster after it occurs.3 2
Because of the structure of the biotechnology industry and the compli-
cated, high magnitude disasters that could result from biotechnology re-
leases, tort liability does not provide adequate prevention of risk through
an incentive system."3 Prerelease screening by the government provides the
best means for controlling the potential dangers of release biotechnology.
28. See generally Green, Genetic Technology.- Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48 IND.
L.J. 559, 574-75 (1973) (genetic engineering development follows usual pattern of progress in tech-
nology: "At every stage, the potential or demonstrated benefits are obvious and immediate ....
Potential adverse consequences . . . tend to be relatively remote and speculative.").
29. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLiCATIONS REPORT, supra note 24, at III (release biotechnology
risks "are best described as 'low probability of high consequence risks'; that is, while there is only a
small possibility of occurrence, the damage that could occur is great").
30. See id. at 45-46 (because organisms inexorably expand in favorable environment, size of re-
lease is not critical factor; small release could result in "major environmental damage or adverse
public health effects").
31. Potential Environmental Consequences, supra note 7, at 115 (statement of Thomas Mc-
Garity) (if unanticipated detrimental impacts occur, "it may not be possible to call [the released or-
ganisms] back like we recall defective automobiles"); see also Wines, supra note 26, at 2100 (little
research into recalling organisms has been conducted).
32. The cost of prevention is reasonable so long as it is less than the expected loss through disas-
ters not prevented. The risks of release biotechnology appear to be analogous to toxic chemical and
nuclear power dangers, dangers for which elaborate preventive regulatory structures have been cre-
ated. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1982) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629(1982) (TSOA). A regulatory mechanism to prevent release biotechnology disasters constitutes a rea-
sonable allocation of resources today. If, in the future, information makes clear that these risks do notdeserve careful, preventive attention, resources can be diverted to other problem areas. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-07; see also McGarity & Bayer, supra note 10, at 486 ("[w]hen conduct
entails a very small probability of a very high consequence accident, the regulatory entity must ensure
that the accident never happens"); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv.
L. REV. 393, 431 (1981) (even if data is uncertain, regulator should use comprehensive analysis in
attempt to prevent policy error where error could cause irreversible or catastrophic harm).
33. The risks of release biotechnology present an externalities problem. The government must
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II. CONSTRAINTS ON EFFECTIVE PIRERELEASE SCREENING
The nature of the industry and the nature of the hazards associated
with release biotechnology combine to create the need for government reg-
ulation through prerelease screening. As it attempts to screen release pro-
posals, the federal government will face difficulties caused by the extreme
uncertainty surrounding release risk assessment and by the inadequate
structures and powers that have evolved within the government to cope
with this regulatory challenge.
A. Uncertain Science Mixed With Value Judgments
Scientists can never exactly predict the risk of a release, because no
experiment can fully replicate the complex natural environment that a
released genetically engineered organism will enter. Yet even if scientists
could precisely determine the risks of release biotechnologies, prerelease
screening would still present a difficult regulatory problem. The regulator
would compare the exact risk measurement for a release proposal, ex-
pressed in terms of the probability and magnitude of the expected harm,
3 4
with the biotechnology's expected benefits. She would then have to decide,
based upon a value judgment involving moral, economic, and other consid-
erations, whether the risk was acceptable or unacceptable. 5 Prerelease
screening decisions thus necessarily involve both factual determinations
and value judgments.
Because scientists cannot precisely predict risk, the factual determina-
tion in prerelease screening is itself a tangled one. The factual questions
here are "science policy" questions:3 6 value judgments enter into pre-
intervene because industry has insufficient market incentives to take its products' risks adequately into
account as it makes production decisions. Government intervention solely through a tort liability struc-
ture would create insufficient incentives for several reasons. Many biotechnology companies are judg-
ment proof. Small biotechnology firms are in a precarious financial situation, see supra notes 19-20,
and larger firms are investing through agreements that could shield them from substantial liability, see
supra text accompanying note 21. The availability of insurance also blunts the incentive created by
the threat of tort liability. Furthermore, proving causation in the biotechnology context may be diffi-
cult. See Karny, supra note 10, at 855. See generally Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 19-28 (1980) (discussing inadequate deterrence of
harm-based liability rules).
34. Expressions of risk are typically compound measures that describe the probability of harm
and its severity. W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RisK 70 (1976).
35. "Risks are measured. Only when those risks are weighed on the balance of social values can
safety be judged: a thing is safe if its attendant risks are judged to be acceptable." Id. at 75 (empha-
sis in original). See Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and
Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 521 (1978) ("regulatory decisions involve
moral as well as economic values"). In release biotechnology decisionmaking, one moral issue involves
opinions about rapid and widespread use of a powerful, "unnatural" technology. One economic issue
concerns the trade-off necessary between profits for the industry through unrestrained sale of benefi-
cial products and costs imposed by a regulatory scheme to protect health and the environment.
36. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 732 (1979).
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release decisionmaking during the risk assessment stage because scientists
asked to assess risk cannot separate factual determinations from their sub-
jective feelings about the probability of harm and the acceptability of tak-
ing risks.3 7 As scientists make decisions about what risk possibilities to
investigate and what test procedures to employ, they make assumptions
that reflect their political and ethical preferences.3" These preferences are
typically not explicitly stated along with the risk determinations; thus un-
known biases skew risk measurements. 9 As the government attempts to
evaluate release proposals through existing decisionmaking processes, the
scientific information available about the possibility of harm will be ex-
traordinarily uncertain because of the lack of risk investigation to date, the
uncertainty inherent in predicting interactions with the natural environ-
ment, and the unknown biases hidden in the available predictions.
McGarity discusses four reasons for a scientific question being in reality a "science policy" question:
(1) sufficient information to answer the question conclusively may not exist, but an experiment could
be performed to gather data and answer the question, (2) scientists may interpret gathered data differ-
ently, (3) scientists may disagree over inferences from data, or (4) the question may be "trans-
scientific" because no experiment can be conducted to gather sufficient data and resolve interpretative
disputes. Id. at 732-47. Alvin Weinberg explains "trans-scientific" questions as follows:
Many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction between science or technology
and society. . . hang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet which
cannot be answered by science. I propose the term trans-scientific for these questions since,
though they are, epistemologically speaking, questions of fact and can be stated in the language
of science, they are unanswerable by science; they transcend science.
Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERvA 209, 209 (1972) (emphasis in original). The
question of a release biotechnology's risk is a science policy question today both because it is trans-
scientific (no experiment short of actual release can conclusively assess the risk associated with release)
and because little investigation of release risks has taken place (insufficient data and disagreements in
interpreting the data exist although experiments could alleviate this situation).
37. "The belief that science is inherently removed from political consideration and that scientists
are, therefore, political celibates is a longstanding one, but in the present social context of science, it is
an anachronism." Curbing Ignorance and Arrogance: The Science Court Proposal and Alternatives,
19 JURIM-IcS J. 387, 421 (1979) (statement of Professor Dorothy Nelkin). See Ashford, Ryan &
Caldart, A Hard Look At Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure From Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking, 7 HARv. ENvTr. L. REv. 297, 311 (1983) (understanding "science policy" nature of
question is central step in assessing adequacy of agency's determination of risk; "[s]imply deferring to
agency expertise on all determinations that appear to be 'scientific' overlooks the subjective determina-
tions at the heart of the agency's decisions"). A debate concerning the separability of scientific from
policy issues surprisingly continues in the legal and scientific literature. Resolution of the separabil-
ity/non-separability question has important implications for decisionmaking structures. See Yellin,
Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environmental
Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983). Yellin examines cases which "demonstrate that the dis-
tinction between scientific and legal issues is arbitrary and unworkable," id. at 1316, and proposes
institutional changes that take into account this impossibility.
38. See O'Brien, Marbury, The APA, and Science-Policy Disputes: The Alluring and Elusive
JudiciallAdministrative Partnership, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 476 n.164 (1984) (scien-
tists' choices of models and tests involve normative, political decisions). Value judgments likewise enter
into calculation of a release biotechnology's potential benefits. The primary problem with benefit
information, however, is not uncertainty and scarcity, but exaggeration. See supra notes 27-28.
39. See Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values, and Human Judgment, 194 Sc. 389, 392
(1976) (National Academy of Sciences and others involved in technology assessment are "willing...
to let the process of combining facts and values remain subject to the unexamined vagaries of human
judgment").
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Although risk estimates will never be precise, scientific knowledge must
contribute to decisionmaking regarding release biotechnology if the gov-
ernment is effectively to prevent unacceptable risks and allow acceptable
ones. 0 The decisionmaker cannot refrain from action indefinitely, hoping
for scientific certainty; either wholesale preclusion or acceptance of release
biotechnology products would disserve society.41 Yet in taking action the
decisionmaker must have time meaningfully to consider risk and benefit
information before making a policy judgment about a release proposal.
Information concerning risk must be obtained and understood, while bias
in both benefit and risk estimates must be dealt with. These information
generating and processing needs interact with constraints imposed by time
and resource concerns to form boundaries for effective biotechnology re-
lease evaluation.
Effective decisionmaking must combine available technical information
with an explicit political determination concerning the acceptability of the
risks associated with a genetically altered organism's release.42 The risk
40. Though value judgments confuse risk and benefit estimates and a political actor ultimately
decides the regulatory question, risk and benefit information is not irrelevant.
The crucial distinction among Non-Separatists is the degree of belief they profess in the
logical progression from the proposition that most environmental issues are Non-Separable
[into purely factual and purely political components], to the proposition that in practirc all
environmental controversies turn on "policy" questions, to the conclusion that science, and by
implication, rational analysis itself, have little to contribute to the resolution of environmental
problems.
Yellin, supra note 37, at 1306 n.27. Yellin correctly rejects complete belief in this logic as "a celebra-
tion of ignorance." Id. See Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Gov-
ernment Regulation, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 808, 809, 813 (1975) (when government contemplates
regulation to reduce risk, "an attempt is required to state both the cost and the benefits in quantitative
form;" if public officials "choose to flaunt such data, let that then be clear"). But see Green, The Risk-
Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 805 (1975) (approving of
agency decisionmakers determining safety "not only by superimposing value judgments upon authori-
tative risk-benefit analyses... but also by making explicit or implicit adjustments in the evaluation of
the risks and benefits themselves"). The approach Green advocates, rejected here, removes deci-
sionmakers from accountability, allowing them to disguise value judgments as "scientific" conclusions.
This easy method of obfuscation distinguishes scientific regulatory questions from other uncertain
regulatory problems.
41. Because it appears that many release biotechnologies will be both useful and safe, the regula-
tory challenge is to keep from the market those few products that may cause catastrophic harm while
allowing society to reap the benefits of safe genetically engineered organisms. See Potential Environ-
mental Consequences, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Dr. Martin Alexander) ("meaningful but not
onerous series of tests" essential in evaluating potential dangers).
42. A National Academy of Sciences report on decisionmaking in the toxic chemicals context cor-
rectly recommends that "[vlalue judgments about noncommensurate factors in a decision such as life,
health, aesthetics, and equity should be explicitly dealt with by the politically responsible decision
makers and not hidden in purportedly objective data and analysis .... " CoMm. ON PRINCIPLES OF
DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT, DECISION MAKING FOR
REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (1975). See Radnitzky, Science, Technology, and
Political Responsibility, 21 MINERVA 234, 259 (1983) (precondition for rational discussion "is that
the evaluative standpoints be made explicit-otherwise they could not be criticised-and that a clear
distinction is made between the scientific forecasts and the extra-scientific evaluations"). An "explicit
political determination" means that the decisionmaker publicly acknowledges that she has studied
evidence for and against regulation (evidence which is made available to the public), and that her
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acceptability determination is necessarily a political decision-involving
the balancing of economic, aesthetic, moral, environmental, and public
health considerations-and thus its legitimacy requires a clear statement
of the decision and accountability for it by the decisionmaker.43 If the
decisionmaker refuses openly to acknowledge the political nature of re-
lease biotechnology regulation, and instead asserts that regulatory deci-
sions stem only from "scientific facts," public control over acceptability
determinations will be more difficult and the decisions will constitute a
less legitimate exercise of political power."
To deal effectively with the complex prerelease regulatory problem,
therefore, the government should employ a decisionmaking system that ac-
complishes four goals: (1) the creation and understanding of risk esti-
mates,45 (2) compensation for biases that enter into expert risk and benefit
estimates, (3) accountable decisionmaking that explicitly applies value
judgments in determining the acceptability of risk, and (4) decisionmaking
accomplished despite time and resource constraints.
B. The Inadequacy of EPA Regulation Under the Current TSCA
According to the 1984 "Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, '46 EPA will use TSCA47 to regulate those
biotechnology products that are not pesticides or other substances covered
by more particularized statutes.48 TSCA's basic structure is well-suited
decision consists of a judgment as to the proper balance among competing options and values. The
alternative is a dishonest decisionmaker who states simply that scientific information forces him to
make a particular decision, or that science has proven a product safe, therefore making regulation
unnecessary.
43. Administrative agencies' decisionmaking "must be acceptable-that is, perceived as legiti-
mate-both to those who are directly affected by agency decisions and to the general public as well."
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-T)pe Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Eco-
nomic, and Social Issues, 71 Mic. L. REv. 111, 146-47 (1972). Richard Sennett explains that
legitimacy in our democracy depends upon "visible" and "legible" use of authority, for this "offers the
subjects a chance to negotiate with their rulers and to see more clearly what their rulers can and
cannot-should and should not-do." R. SENNETT, AUTHORrrY 168 (1980).
44. A problem of legitimacy arises because "use of sophisticated mathematical and biological mod-
els . . . distance[s] a modem agency's reasoning from ordinary experience and insulate[s] regulatory
decisions from generalist review." Yellin, supra note 37, at 1300. Accountability lies at the heart of a
democratic system of government. To legitimate the government's use of power in regulatory decision-
making, "the electorate must have an opportunity for the final say about which risks it will bear and
which benefits it will seek." Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 22 JURIMmmics J.
372, 375 (1982) (emphasis in original).
45. The effective decisionmaking system must stress risk creation and understanding because, of
the two sides of the issue here, risk considerations are ignored much more than are benefit considera-
tions. Benefit information will exist, because manufacturers have an incentive to produce such infor-
mation; the challenge for decisionmaking is to cope with bias in benefit estimates.
46. Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10.
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
48. Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,887. The plan involves five federal agen-
cies-EPA, NIH, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Na-
tional Science Foundation-that will each assert regulatory authority over certain aspects of biotech-
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for the release biotechnology oversight task. The statute, however, was
designed to regulate the dangers of toxic chemicals, and rests on certain
assumptions about the regulatory context that are not valid in the case of
release biotechnology.4 9 The current TSCA, as it applies to biotechnology,
establishes insufficient regulatory power and fails to prescribe adequately
the prerelease decisionmaking process. Congress must amend the statute if
EPA oversight is to be more than camouflage under which the biotechnol-
ogy industry develops without restraint.50
1. TSCA's Basic Framework
As a prerequisite to any control action under the current version of
TSCA, EPA must read the act's definition of "chemical substance" 5' to
include genetically engineered organisms.52 Once EPA establishes jurisdic-
tion over release biotechnologies, TSCA provides broad authority to pre-
vent environmental and health hazards.53
According to TSCA's premanufacture notice provisions, the manufac-
turer of a new genetically engineered product will be required to notify
EPA ninety days before commercial production commences.5" The notice
must identify the product and must include any health or environmental
test data in the manufacturer's possession or control.55 After receiving
premanufacture notification, EPA can act to block release of the organism
in two ways. First, if the EPA Administrator finds that the product may
present an unreasonable risk or that it will be produced in substantial
nology through existing statutes. Major statutes used in the plan include TSCA, FIFRA, several
animal and plant pest control laws, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(1982). See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10; see also Plan Update, supra note 12, at
47,177-95 (revised matrix listing all regulatory authority applicable to biotechnology). A cumbersome,
two-tiered science advisory board system will advise the agencies and coordinate their activities. See
Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,904-05; see also Plan Update, supra note 12, at
47,174-76.
49. See, e.g., infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
50. Amending TSCA is preferable to attempting to draft and pass entirely new legislation because
the basic TSCA framework is suitable for release biotechnology regulation. See Potential Environ-
mental Consequences, supra note 7, at 129 (statement of Thomas McGarity) (discussing disadvan-
tages of attempting to construct new regulatory structure).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2).
52. The legality of using TSCA's regulatory power to control commercial release biotechnology is
questionable. The creative interpretation of "chemical substance" necessary to establish authority over
genetically engineered products, see Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,886-87, may
be challenged in court.
53. In addition to the premanufacture regulatory framework that TSCA establishes, the statute
gives EPA the power to require testing of and to control use of products already in commerce, and it
allows the agency to require certain record-keeping and reporting by manufacturers. See 15 U.S.C. §§
2603, 2605-07.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1); Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,887.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(1). TSCA imposes no routine testing requirements on manufactur-
ers; they only must submit information concerning health and environmental risks that they have
voluntarily obtained.
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quantities, EPA can by rule require more testing.56 Pending testing by the
manufacturer, EPA can obtain an injunction to block release.57 Second, if
the EPA Administrator finds that the organism will present an unreason-
able risk to health or to the environment, the agency must by rule ban or
regulate use of the genetically engineered product.5" If the Administrator
takes no action within ninety days after premanufacture notification, the
company can proceed with production and sale.59
2. Inadequate Screening Power for Biotechnology
The 1984 plan for biotechnology regulation thus anticipates the EPA
Administrator determining, within a very short period of time, whether a
release biotechnology product might produce an unreasonable risk. This
short screening period may be adequate for regulating chemical dangers,
where the volume of new chemicals is great and structural information
allows some meaningful but quick assessment of risk.60 Ninety days, how-
ever, is an unrealistic and unnecessarily constricted 1 time frame for the
meaningful assessment by EPA of a release biotechnology's potential
dangers.
During TSCA's short screening period, EPA cannot know what tests
would aid the regulatory decision 2 or meaningfully examine a release
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a). The move to require testing by the manufacturer must also be based
on the existence of insufficient data upon which health and environmental impacts can reasonably be
predicted. See id. A rule requiring testing must be promulgated pursuant to § 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, with the added requirement that interested persons have the opportunity to give
an oral presentation of data. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(5).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(A). The Administrator must initiate proceedings to block produc-
tion through an injunction at least 45 days before the premanufacture notification period is set to
expire, thus within 45 days of the original notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(B).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605. Rulemaking to limit or ban a product's use must be conducted in
accordance with § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act and the special requirements enumerated
in TSCA, which include a required opportunity for an informal hearing. See id.
59. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,894. In sum, EPA has 45 days in
which to initiate the process of obtaining an injunction pending testing or 90 days to initiate a
rulemaking proceeding to ban use of a release biotechnology, if the manufacturer is to be blocked from
production when the notice period ends. EPA can extend the notice period to 180 days "for good
cause;" the reasons for such an extension must appear in the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(c).
An extension constitutes final agency action subject to judicial review. Id.
60. EPA reviews approximately 1500 new chemicals under TSCA each year. See Lewis, Review-
ing New Chemicals, E.P.A. J., June 1985, at 6, 6. While quick tests do exist for estimating a chemi-
cal's risks, the reliability of these tests has been questioned. See, e.g., Stanfield, Few Are Satisfied with
Statutes Aimed at Controlling the Chemical Revolution, 1984 NAT'L J. 2200, 2203 (EPA will allow
production of chemical without further tests if chemical structure is similar to that of chemicals con-
sidered safe, "a practice that some fear could lead to a health disaster").
61. At least for the next few years, the volume of release biotechnology proposals will be much
more manageable than the volume of new chemicals; EPA can thus afford to engage in longer, more
extensive scrutiny of the release proposals. See OTA 1984 ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 386 (500
genetic manipulation patents pending in 1984, with 200 applications received per year [figures include
organisms developed for contained use as well as for release]).
62. A testing rule promulgated under TSCA must specify exactly what type of test the manufac-
turer must perform. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b).
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biotechnology's risks, because information about risks is not easily accessi-
ble 3 and EPA lacks staff scientists with expertise in fields related to re-
lease biotechnology regulation." Yet, unless the EPA Administrator takes
affirmative action to require testing and obtain an injunction, or to control
use of the substance through rulemaking, release cannot be delayed long
enough for a useful examination of risk. The government has acknowl-
edged that risk assessment methodologies are not yet capable of quick
safety determinations.65 EPA plans, however, to process and approve re-
lease biotechnology proposals quickly without such methodologies,66
thereby providing very little assessment or regulation of biotechnology's
hazards.67 Thus, without routine, significant action by EPA to delay re-
lease and thoroughly examine risk-discretionary action which the agency
indicates it will not take-the prerelease look at genetically engineered
products under TSCA will have little chance of preventing unacceptable
63. "[U]ncertainty about the risks of releasing genetically engineered material into the environ-
ment is the salient feature" of the release biotechnology regulatory problem. McChesney & Adler,
supra note 7, at 10,368. The "key problem" for EPA's Office of Toxic Substances is "to develop
reasonable risk assessment methodologies" for release biotechnologies. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Regulation of Genetically Engineered Substances Under TSCA (March, 1983), reprinted in
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 24, at 109, 139. Scientists have "bemoaned the
lack of a data base for assessing the environmental effects of deliberate release" and warned of the
"small but possible chance of environmental disaster." More Research on rDNA Risk Assessment
Called For by Speakers at NAS Conference, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1412, 1412 (Mar. 1, 1985).
64. Consideration of release biotechnology's risks requires microbiologists, biochemists, public
health specialists, and broad-scale ecologists, among others. EPA's Office of Toxic Substances does not
have this type of staff. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Genetically Engi-
neered Substances Under TSCA (March, 1983), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS RE-
PORT, supra note 24, at 109, 138-39. Government scientists must consider release risks through care-
ful, case-by-case examinations because established, quick risk assessment methodologies do not exist.
Reliance on members of a science advisory board for case-by-case evaluations is unsatisfactory in part
because members devote little time to the advisory work and thus an advisory board could not handle
the caseload. See Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in Regulatory Deci-
sionmaking, Sci., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES, Winter 1984, at 72, 79 (advisory committees in toxic
substances control area meet less often than every six weeks).
65. The 1984 executive branch plan notes "the absence of generally accepted principles of risk
assessment," Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,894, and states that a major issue is
"the need to determine what information is necessary for assessing the risks." Id. at 50,882.
66. According to the Reagan Administration Plan, EPA will work to develop a data base and risk
assessment methodologies, but EPA will not delay commercial releases until rudimentary information
can be developed. The agency intends to determine the level of risk understanding necessary for a
"reasoned evaluation" on a case-by-case basis. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at
50,894. Don R. Clay, Director of EPA's Office of Toxic Substances, has said that "[w]e can decide
the science is not ready, but the products are coming [for review under TSCA]," indicating that
review will proceed despite inadequate scientific knowledge in EPA. See Risk Assessment Methods
Insufficient for Genetically Altered Products, EPA Says, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 428, 428 (July
20, 1984).
67. Most telling in this regard is a recent action by Dr. Bernadine Healy, Deputy Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. In the process of cancelling a National Academy of Sciences
study on risk assessment capabilities, Healy said that it would be "absurd" to hold up biotechnology
progress while the government explores scientific questions. Study of Scientific Basis for Regulation of
rDNA Products Shelved After Criticism, 9 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 72, 72 (April 19, 1985).
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risk. A statute supposedly invoked for prerelease screening68 should actu-
ally provide that such evaluation will take place, instead of simply making
evaluation possible at the Administrator's discretion. The TSCA regula-
tory scheme fails to meet the fourth goal of an effective decisionmaking
system: by imposing an extreme and unnecessary time constraint, the
ninety-day provision prevents a meaningful decision about risk.
3. Politically Muddled Decisionmaking
Just as the structure of TSCA's regulatory power effectively creates the
undesirable presumption of release biotechnology's safety,69 the decision-
making process with which EPA implements TSCA will prevent mean-
ingful, accountable prerelease screening. An informed attempt at pre-
release evaluation is especially important for prevention of unreasonable
risks, because unlike incorrect control actions that EPA may initiate under
TSCA, a mistaken staff decision to allow release will most likely be the
final action until an unacceptable harm occurs.70 The current decision-
making mechanisms in EPA, however, in addition to operating under an
unreasonable time limit, fail to satisfy the first three goals of an effective
decisionmaking system.
In deciding whether to take action during the TSCA premanufacture
notification period, EPA now relies on the limited information submitted
by the manufacturer,7 1 a possible staff investigation of the product's risk, 2
and possible consultation with an advisory committee composed of scien-
tists."' Because TSCA leaves the thoroughness of investigation entirely up
68. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,886 (TSCA described as means of
acting against risks before harm can occur).
69. The presumption of safety exists because meaningful consideration of risk is not routine. As
TSCA's powers are now set up, only the extraordinary release proposal would seem to need scru-
tiny-thus ordinary releases are presumed safe.
70. Incorrect control actions-actions to regulate when risk is acceptable rather than unaccept-
able-will automatically be further scrutinized during the court or administrative hearing required by
TSCA. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Challenge of EPA staff decisions not to take
any action and to allow release, however, will be difficult and infrequent. Courts traditionally defer to
agency decisions not to act, see Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, supra note 37, at 304, 310 n.67 (criticizing
deference in situations similar to prerelease regulation under TSCA), and concerned citizens will only
infrequently bring suit under TSCA's citizen suit provision because of lack of money and the current
lack of public information.
71. See supra note 55.
72. In reviewing chemicals, EPA completes many premanufacture reviews within three weeks of
notice, thus devoting very little time and energy to the majority of premanufacture submissions under
TSCA. See Reauthorization of Toxic Substances Control Act For Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1983) (statement of Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administra-
tor, EPA). EPA must currently review and decide on the safety of a new chemical every 90 minutes.
Debating EPA's New Chemicals Program: A Forum, E.P.A. J., June 1985, at 12, 12 (statement of
Sen. Durenberger).
73. Numerous advisory committees are available to supplement EPA staff work, but the helpful-
ness of these committees is limited. See supra note 64 and infra notes 80 & 83. The Reagan Adminis-
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to the EPA Administrator, the statute does nothing to guarantee that any
risk or benefit investigation will take place.7 4 The statute and EPA prac-
tice thus fail to provide for any systematic creation and understanding of
risk estimates, estimates obviously crucial to prerelease decisionmaking.
EPA attempts to distinguish between "risk assessment"' (when it takes
place) and "risk management17 in its internal operations, but makes no
special attempt to assess benefits carefully.17  The agency has been frus-
trated by the impossibility of making purely scientific risk assessments. 71
Instead of adopting procedures that compensate for this phenomenon of
values mixing with facts, however, EPA has adopted procedures that serve
to divert attention from the problem of unknown biases in risk and benefit
estimates. EPA attempts to reduce public expectations that high risk as-
sessments mean that risk must be prevented, 7  and the agency sometimes
consults an expert panel for additional value-laden advice,80 rather than
tration Plan calls for a special science advisory committee to assist EPA in biotechnology regulation.
According to the plan, the manufacturer will be able to request the committee to review a
premanufacture notice, but other interested parties such as environmentalists will not have this privi-
lege. The committee need not grant any request for consideration of a release proposal, even if the
request comes from EPA. See Reagan Administration Plan, supra note 10, at 50,905. Establishment
of the EPA biotechnology advisory committee is expected in early 1986 and will be announced in the
Federal Register. See Plan Update, supra note 12, at 47,174.
74. TSCA nowhere requires either a staff investigation or consultation with an advisory commit-
tee. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
75. "Risk assessment is the use of a base of scientific research to define the probability of some
harm coming to an individual or a population as a result of exposure to a substance or situation."
Speech by William Ruckelshaus, then EPA Administrator, at Princeton University (Feb. 18, 1984),
reprinted in E.P.A. J., April 1984, at 12, 12.
76. "Risk management, in contrast, is the public process of deciding what to do where risk has
been determined to exist." Id.
77. See Speech by William Ruckelshaus, then EPA Administrator, before the National Academy
of Sciences (June 22, 1983), reprinted in E.P.A. J., July 1983, at 3, 4 (National Academy of Sciences
has recommended "that these two functions be separated as much as possible within a regulatory
agency. This is what we now do at EPA . . ... "). A preferable scheme consists of three separate
functions-risk assessment, benefit assessment, and risk management. Without benefit assessment as a
separate function from ultimate risk management decisionmaking, the decisionmaker can easily alter
benefit data to fit whatever decision he is inclined to make.
78. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 75, at 12 (separation of risk assessment from risk management
found "more difficult to accomplish in practice. . . . [V]alues, which are supposed to be safely se-
questered in risk management, also appear as important influences on the outcomes of risk
assessments.").
79. Recent EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus has stated that one of EPA's goals in deal-
ing with uncertain risk assessments is to convince the public not to take such assessments too seriously.
This tactic gives the agency more flexibility in deciding when to act because of lowered public expec-
tations about the need to act. See id. at 14-15 (describing public relations efforts).
80. EPA, for example, in 1984 established a Risk Assessment Forum for consultation on risk
assessment questions. See Goldstein, Strengthening the Assessment of Risk, E.P.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 5,
6. Multiple risk assessments do not ensure increased accuracy, because of the hidden biases in the
estimates. After a certain point, attempts to resolve scientific uncertainty are wasted efforts. Necessary
for an effective decisionmaking system is a concerted attempt to cope with uncertain information, once
available data has been gathered, rather than an attempt immediately to abolish scientific uncertainty.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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moving to a decisionmaking format that compensates for bias and meets
the second goal of effective decisionmaking81
Recent occurrences in EPA show how information-gathering is easily
distorted within the agency," even when an expert science advisory board
is consulted.8 3 The decisionmaker can decide to produce only information
favorable to his initial view of the premanufacture notice and thus can
hide behind "scientific" justification for his decision. This possibility
shields the decisionmaker from public accountability and increases the
likelihood that prerelease decisions will not reflect society's view of accept-
able risk, but merely a high-ranking EPA official's view of acceptability.
Because the decisionmaking process does nothing to encourage an explic-
itly political determination regarding safety, based upon publicly available
risk and benefit information, the current process fails to satisfy the third
goal of an effective decisionmaking framework, that of accountability.
EPA's present methods of decisionmaking will not guarantee that risk
estimates are before the decisionmaker. They will not accomplish compen-
sation for biases in risk and benefit information, nor will they ensure that
the ultimate decision about whether to regulate is an explicitly political
one. Instead, the current system makes the amount of energy and re-
sources employed in decisionmaking totally discretionary and allows for
the political manipulation of data as well as resources. Any prerelease
screening that does occur is likely to be politically muddled from the out-
set because the decisionmaking processes are not carefully defined. At least
until the risks of release biotechnology are better understood, a more rig-
81. Accepting rather than responding to the bias problem, EPA Assistant Administrator John
Moore has stated:
The activities leading to characterization of risk are more fraught with assumptions and
subjectivities than one would like. Similarly, the methods available for analyzing the non-risk
factors in a quantitative manner are weak. Therefore, risk management decisions are anything
but "cut-and-dried." But then, that's the way it is with risk assessment/risk management...
not predictable perhaps, but always interesting!
Moore, Making Decisions About Risk, E.P.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 8, 9.
82. Top EPA officials held secret "science forums," with only industry representatives present, to
critique technical documents (prepared by EPA scientists) on the dangers of formaldehyde and DEHP
(diethylhexylphthlate). Numerous conclusions in these technical documents were changed, and they
then became the basis for the widely criticized decisions not to regulate either of the substances under
TSCA. See Rushefsky, The Misuse of Science in Governmental Decisionmaking, Sc., TECH. &
HUMAN VALUES, Summer 1984, at 47, 48-51; Sandier, EPA's Secret "Science Courts", ENV'T, Jan.-
Feb. 1982, at 4, 4.
83. The Reagan Administration has attempted to replace many of the scientists on EPA's Science
Advisory Board because their views are no longer "acceptable" (though this motivation has not been
stated publicly, in an effort to maintain the image that the advisory board gives purely objective
scientific advice). See Ashford, supra note 64, at 72. This highlights the ability to manipulate, without
easy public scrutiny, the advice given by advisory committees. EPA officials can either alter committee
findings or load the committees with scientists whose views are "acceptable," who will themselves
tailor their conclusions according to the polities of the administration.
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orous, more open investigation must take place if EPA is to answer ade-
quately the extraordinarily complex prerelease regulatory question.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE EPA DECISIONMAKING
Congress should step in to modify the executive branch's plan for deal-
ing with the dangers of release biotechnology. An amended TSCA should
set up two types of premanufacture review for release biotechnology or-
ganisms and should ensure that, at least initially, EPA review is rigorous.
A. Intensive, Quasi-Adversarial Review
Congress should specify that in the case of biotechnology products,
8 4
premanufacture notification under TSCA must come at least one year
before production for release.8 5 A statutory change in the time allowed for
EPA consideration of release proposals will negate the current require-
ment of significant EPA action merely to give the agency enough time to
engage in prerelease screening. This change gives EPA the minimum time
necessary for meaningful decisionmaking, allowing the agency to fulfill
the fourth goal of an effective decisionmaking system."8
Although the ultimate decisionmaker in prerelease screening is the EPA
Administrator, a political actor, 7 some decisions will depend on the pro-
cess through which the Administrator and the agency staff evaluate the
product.88 To replace the present unstructured and politically muddled
84. Amendment of the statute should obviously make EPA's jurisdiction over biotechnology
explicit.
85. The year breaks down into six months for EPA to prepare reports, four months for public
comment, and two months for decisionmaking about the release proposal. See infra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text. This structure of one year in which to act according to a required decisionmaking
plan is superior to a typical permitting system, one without time constraints on an agency's examina-
tion of a permit application. A permitting system would give EPA an infinite amount of time to act
and thus open up an easy mechanism for inordinate delay in allowing releases, should EPA be so
inclined.
86. In addition to requiring one year for prerelease review, meeting the fourth goal of decision-
making within time and resource constraints also depends upon Congress appropriating sufficient
funds to EPA for TSCA implementation. While funds must be forthcoming, money alone cannot
accomplish the complex task of prerelease review; a qualified EPA staff must be given time in which
to use the money to good effect.
87. The decisionmaker under TSCA is the EPA Administrator, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1982), but in practice decisions may be made by the likewise politically appointed Assistant Adminis-
trator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances.
88. The emphasis on procedure in these proposed TSCA amendments gains strength not only
from the general sense that procedures make a difference and must be specified in administrative and
judicial proceedings, but also from recent emphasis in the economics and political science literature on
the importance of rational procedures for information-gathering to inform our decisionmaking. Nobel
Prize-winning economist Herbert Simon has stressed the importance of "procedural rationality." See
SIMON, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought in 2 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
444, 452 (1982) ("we must give an account not only of substantive rationality ... but also proce-
dural rationality-the effectiveness, in light of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the proce-
dures used to choose actions") (emphasis in original). In political science, "policy analysis" is an
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decisionmaking procedures used to implement TSCA, Congress should
specify a quasi-adversarial decisionmaking process89 that will put under-
standable risk and benefit information before the decisionmaker and the
public, 0 and that will then require the EPA Administrator to make an
explicitly political decision concerning the acceptability of a release propo-
sal's risks.91
The quasi-adversarial process would employ two groups within EPA to
present evidence to the decisionmaker. 92 A group of staff scientists, with
expanding sub-discipline aiming towards the "structured use of information to illuminate the conse-
quences of choice." DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA.
L. REv. 257, 330 (1979). "The basic policy analysis criticism of government is that agencies fre-
quently do not structure decisionmaking processes in ways that make explicit the agency's choices and
the trade-offs inherent in these choices." Id.
The proposal here responds to both the necessity to gather data and the necessity to use that data in
a way that addresses this policy analysis criticism. Informed, accountable decisionmaking is an im-
provement over the current unstructured process: the decisionmaker will feel constrained by the force
of the information before him and by the political forces he must contend with after making an
accountable decision. Thus, the TSCA amendments will change the substantive outcomes in release
biotechnology decisionmaking. More releases-unacceptable releases-will be blocked if an effective
decisionmaking system is implemented than would be prevented if TSCA and its use remain
unchanged.
89. The adversary system "represents a public forum in which there is a fair opportunity to
present opposing views." Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 505 (1981). Two important outcomes of employing the
adversary model are thus information and a sense of fairness. In the administrative law context, the
idea of fairness as a goal extends beyond fairness to the individual parties involved: "the public is
treated unfairly when a rulemaker hides his crucial decisions, or his reasons for them, or when he
fails to give good faith attention to all the information and contending views . . . ." Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 379
(1975) (emphasis in original). The analogy of the process advocated here to the adversarial system of
decisionmaking used in American courts is intended to be a limited one, focusing on the information
presentation process and the fair decisionmaking that such presentation can produce.
A central difference between the adversarial method of decisionmaking and an investigatory or
inquisitorial model is the control of the two sides over "what data and arguments should be used in
support of the decision." Boyer, supra note 43, at 120-21. This method of using adversaries to pre-
sent information to the decisionmaker serves to assure "the adjudicator the proper informational input
before he decides the'case." This is, as Professor Damaska explains, extremely important to the
proper functioning of the American "coordinate" model of adjudication as opposed to the continental
"hierarchical" model. Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480, 527 (1975). The development of all relevant information is crucial in the American
trial because factual investigation does not occur at the appellate level. See id. at 515. The presenta-
tion of all relevant information is likewise crucial to a release biotechnology decisionmaker, because
the object of prerelease screening is to prevent unacceptable risks and there will be no second inquiry
into a product's dangers if the decisionmaker decides to allow release. The premium is on possession
of all available information, as it is in the American trial, and thus the adversarial approach to infor-
mation gathering fits the prerelease screening situation well.
90. The information is "understandable" in the sense that its bias is explicit; the risk and benefit
descriptions will not be muddled by unknown preferences because the quasi-adversarial process im-
poses a clear policy leaning on each side's presentation.
91. As opposed to the judge or jury in a trial, the EPA decisionmaker must apply value judgments
in addition to the law. The agency decisionmaker should be as explicit and informative to the public
concerning his value judgments as a judge is expected to be in stating the law. See supra text accom-
panying notes 42-44.
92. Information is presented by groups that do not directly represent parties in the controversy,
because of the need for administrative agencies to take all risks and all benefits into account, rather
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members having expertise in all disciplines related to the risks of release
biotechnology,9" would put together a report that makes the strongest pos-
sible case for the risks of the release biotechnology product under review.
Another staff group, consisting of economists, experts on biotechnology's
commercial applications, and others, would draft a report making the best
case for the potential benefits of the genetically engineered organism.
These reports would be published in the Federal Register within six
months of premanufacture notification. After a public comment period,9
both the reports and a summary of the comments would go to the deci-
sionmaker, who would then determine whether any regulatory action
under TSCA was necessary.
In addition to providing the time necessary for careful risk evaluation,
this proposed decisionmaking system addresses the three remaining goals
of effective prerelease screening. First, it provides for the creation and un-
derstanding of risk assessment information. The quasi-adversarial process
creates an incentive for the group of scientists to put together the strongest
case for risk: the scientists' prestige is tied to performing the job of advo-
cate well.9" To aid the group in its risk study, the TSCA amendments
should include a section that allows the scientists to contract for additional
research into release risks and risk assessment methodologies; information
than merely those related to an individual party. Individual interested parties do have the opportunity
to present their cases during the public comment period.
93. EPA will have to hire most members of this group because the Office of Toxic Substances
currently lacks experts in many of the relevant areas. See supra note 64.
94. The public comment period should be long enough for interested parties carefully to respond.
Four months seems appropriate, given that the agency has six months to gather data for the initial,
exhaustive reports.
95. The scientists employed by EPA to prepare the case for risk will be more immune to political
pressure than scientists on science advisory boards because EPA work is their full-time job. The EPA
scientists will derive their professional sense of accomplishment from the agency job, whereas mem-
bers of advisory boards derive satisfaction and prestige mainly from work in universities or in industry
and can approach giving advice to EPA from a more political, rather than professional, standpoint. It
is unlikely that a scientist would take the job of risk advocate (or that an economist would join the
benefit assessment group) without the intention of performing the job well. Performance of the task of
putting together the strongest case for release risks (or benefits) will be monitored publicly through
publication of the reports in the Federal Register. The EPA staff is given a good deal of independence
by the civil service employment system. See generally Rosenbloom, Accountability in the Administra-
tive State in ACCOUNTABILITY IN URBAN SOCIETY 87, 92 (1978) (job tenure of career civil servants
insulates them somewhat from political pressure by appointed superiors). EPA scientists have repeat-
edly exhibited this independence in the past. See, e.g., J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A
SEASON OF SPOILS 141 (1984) (efforts of career scientists at EPA helped prevent loosening of lead-in-
gasoline standard desired by Reagan Administration); supra note 82 (technical documents prepared
by EPA scientists assessed dangers in such a way that regulation seemed necessary; EPA administra-
tors forced to alter documents themselves to support controversial decision not to take action).
Despite the popular conception that scientists are simply objective seekers of truth, the scientific
enterprise follows an adversary model; thus, the group of scientists will not be uncomfortable in its
adversary role. Levine explains that both within single experiments and within the scientific commu-
nity, there are claims and counterclaims advanced by each side of a controversy, with each side at-
tempting to advocate the best possible case for its position. See Levine, Scientific Method and the
Adversary Model, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 661, 669 (1974).
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from this research would supplement information given by manufacturers
and the information available in the scientific literature.9"
Second, by setting up two information-gathering groups, each with an
obvious bias, the quasi-adversarial model compensates for hidden biases
that enter into individual estimates of benefit and risk.97 Each group ar-
gues as best it can for its position, but the argument must be based on
evidence, explained and defended in the report; the reports are analogous
to lawyers' briefs.9" Thus, the decisionmaker knows the conclusions of
each advocacy group, and the nature and number of studies upon which
the conclusions are based. The evidence is further scrutinized through the
public comment procedure.99 In the end, the decisionmaker will have
before her the best available case for the product's risks and the best avail-
able case for the product's benefits.
Finally, the politically accountable EPA Administrator will be forced to
make an explicit value judgment about the situation: the conflicting, pub-
licly presented cases can only thus be resolved.100 Public input into risk
acceptability determinations increases (1) because of the ability to put all
relevant information before the EPA decisionmaker, (2) because knowl-
edgeable public pressure relating to value judgments can be brought to
96. Congress could establish a tax on the sale of biotechnology products to fund such research. In
contrast to exclusively requiring prerelease testing by manufacturers, this contract research approach
would delay the imposition of some financial burdens on innovative new companies until sales of safe
products commence and the companies are better able to survive.
97. The process compensates for the problem of bias in estimates by making the bias explicit and
in one direction, therefore allowing the decisionmaker to more knowledgeably weigh the information.
98. Because the reports must contain arguments supported by evidence, the tendency to exaggerate
benefits is constrained. Because the adversary process creates an incentive to gather informa-
tion-EPA scientists' prestige is tied to presentation of the case for risk-the process compensates for
the tendency to underestimate low probability risks of a new technology. See generally Furrow, supra
note 20, at 1450-51 (hazards of rare technological disasters often ignored); Green, Should Technology
Assessment Guide Public Policy?, 69 A.B.A. J. 930, 931-32 (1983) (especially with new technology,
risks are underweighed and benefits overweighed).
99. The process of report presentation and public scrutiny, followed by required consideration of
the report and public comments in decisionmaking, is analogous to the Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) requirements set up by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4335 (1982); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1985); J. BONINE & T. McGARrrY, THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 119-23 (1984) (explaining procedures for preparing EIS's). The as-
sumption underlying the government's use of the EIS system to put environmental impact information
before a vast array of decisionmakers is the same as the assumption behind the quasi-adversarial
process here-informing the decisionmaker and the public has desirable consequences relating to the
government's ultimate decisions. See 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson)
(describing rationale behind and purpose of NEPA). These desirable consequences include error de-
tection by members of the public, public input as to what values to take into account in decisionmak-
ing, and individual suggestions as to how these values should be weighed.
100. The 1983 departure of EPA Administrator Anne Burford because of adverse public reaction
to her policies shows that the politically appointed officials at EPA are currently at least somewhat
accountable. See Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE
L.J. 1766, 1775 & n.66 (1985). The Reagan Administration, however, has waged war on government
openness and accountability since taking office, see Karp, Liberty Under Siege, HARPEIR's, Nov. 1985,
at 53, and thus regulatory programs emphasizing accountability are especially important today to
preserve democratic principles.
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bear before a prerelease screening decision, and (3) because the transpar-
ent decisionmaking process allows faster, more effective public pressure
even after EPA makes its risk acceptability decision for a particular re-
lease biotechnology product.10' If the government regulates release bio-
technology through the quasi-adversarial decisionmaking process, infor-
mation about risks will be more likely to reach citizens and
decisionmakers while harm remains only a possibility. The legitimacy of
prerelease decisionmaking will increase because of the enhanced ability of
the public to make informed value judgments and to impose these value
judgments on accountable agency officials."0 2
Modern regulatory agencies were created in part because courts could
not handle complex decisionmaking tasks.103 The method American courts
employ for the presentation of information has a place in regulatory agen-
cies, however, when the agencies must resolve extraordinarily uncertain
scientific issues. The "science court" proposals of the 1970's mistakenly
attempted to discover scientific truth by pitting two groups of scientists
against each other.104 The adversary model cannot be employed to abolish
scientific uncertainty, but it can help regulators respond to an uncertain
situation. By bringing out available information on both sides of the issue,
the quasi-adversarial process proposed here clarifies the question and the
competing values at stake. The process enables effective decisionmaking to
take place.
101. In addition to the informal channels for public pressure that are available outside the quasi-
adversarial decisionmaking process, TSCA provides for citizens' suits and petitions. 15 U.S.C. §§
2619-20 (1982).
102. Public participation in decisionmaking has a utilitarian justification (it may lead to better
scientific information), a political justification (it legitimates policies), and a normative justification (it
furthers the public's right to know about public risks). See Furrow, supra note 20, at 1423.
103. See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 21-22 (1978) (decisions to use adminis-
trative process "in addressing a widening range of social and economic problems constitute a cumula-
tive judgment that the procedural methods of the judicial process are not adequate" to meet regulatory
needs); B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 12 (1981) (New Deal ideal states
that "it is the expert agency, unencumbered by abstract legalisms, that promises to craft a policy
responsive to the complexities of environmental relationships").
104. The science court proposals suggest setting up special institutions or procedures within the
government to do away with scientific uncertainty in the same way that legal controversies are re-
solved in courts. See Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncer-
tainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 444-47 (1979). These proposals are
all based on the separability of factual controversies from policy considerations, id. at 447, a premise
that this Note rejects. See Talbott, "Science Court": A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty for
Decisions Based on Scientific "Fact"?, 8 ENVIR. L. 827, 838-39 (1978) (one problem with science
court proposal is proponents' assertions that facts and values are separable). In contrast to science
court proposals, the quasi-adversarial process copes with uncertainty, explicitly acknowledging that
such uncertainty can only slowly decrease and will never completely disappear in the case of release
biotechnology risks.
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B. Expedited Review
The intensive, quasi-adversarial decisionmaking mechanism accom-
plishes real decisionmaking within time and resource constraints that are
reasonable for regulating a new, potentially very harmful technology. Ex-
perience under this rigorous regulatory scheme, however, may establish
that many release biotechnologies present little risk relative to their bene-
fits, and that these products can easily be identified. 05 Therefore, Con-
gress should add flexibility to biotechnology regulation under TSCA by
building an expedited review procedure into the amended statute.1 08
The new TSCA should provide for the possibility of administrative ac-
tion to exempt groups of genetically engineered organisms from intensive
premanufacture review. Under the expedited process, the manufacturers
of these organisms could notify EPA only a short time before release
might take place. If the notification accurately identified the organism as
one eligible for expedited notice because it posed acceptable risk, EPA
would be required to allow release. This provision would be especially
helpful for aiding the development of release biotechnology products, be-
cause once enough information is known for EPA to establish expedited
review, producers could submit a notice covering a whole family of safe
organisms. Thus, in the product development stage the manufacturer's
burden under TSCA regulation would be reduced. Flexibility in the stat-
ute allows the all-important balance between business freedom and safety
concerns to be restruck as knowledge grows.1 07
CONCLUSION
TSCA amendments can enable EPA regulation of health and environ-
mental hazards to keep pace with the rapid development of commercial
105. Experience with laboratory research involving genetically engineered organisms has indicated
that such research presents less risk than initially anticipated, and the NIH Guidelines regulating
research have gradually been made less strict. See Karny, supra note 10, at 857. A similar change in
the regulatory problem could occur as knowledge about release risks increases. Toxic chemical regula-
tion suggests that, while certain release biotechnologies may indeed pose substantial risks, simple com-
positional tests may be developed to identify quickly at least some of the biotechnologies that pose
acceptable risks. See supra text accompanying note 60.
106. One important criterion for evaluating procedural systems is efficiency, the capacity to attain
decisionmaking objectives "at the least possible cost to avoid waste of scarce social resources." Boyer,
supra note 43, at 145. The fourth decisionmaking goal discussed here embodies this criterion; the
expedited review procedure provides the flexibility needed to achieve efficiency as uncertainty
decreases.
107. Nevertheless, Congress must limit EPA's ability to establish expedited review so that this
ability cannot be used to circumvent intensive, quasi-adversarial decisionmaking while such decision-
making remains necessary. Congress could, for example, bar establishment of quick review for several
years and then require a public hearing process to establish eligibility for groups of organisms. The
Controlled Substances Act provides a possible model process for compiling the list of eligible release
biotechnology organisms. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1982) (Attorney General given power to add sub-
stances to drug list by means of formal hearings).
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biotechnology. To cope adequately with the uncertainty now surrounding
release risks, EPA must, at a minimum, have enough time to engage in
meaningful prerelease scrutiny. Furthermore, decisionmaking procedures
must effectively produce and channel information for an accountable deci-
sionmaker. The revolution set in motion by the perfection of genetic engi-
neering techniques should provoke the government to adopt a new deci-
sionmaking approach to extremely uncertain scientific issues. The
combination of agency and judicial virtues in the quasi-adversarial deci-
sionmaking process is especially fitting for the regulation of products made
by combining genes from diverse organisms.
